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SPEECH

OF

MR. CUSHING, OF MASSACHUSETTS,

ON

THE RESOLUTIONS

OF

KENTUCKY AND MASSACHUSETTS,

RECOMMENDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE

PROCEEDS OF THE PUBLIC LANDS

AMONG THE STATES.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 23, 1836.



WASHINGTON:

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SPEECH.

Mr. CUSHING said:—

The resolutions of the Legislature of Kentucky recommend the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands among the several States, in the ratio of their federal numbers; and the question pending is on the motion of the gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. C. ALLAN,) which instructs the Committee of Ways and Means to bring in a bill in conformity with those resolutions.

The Legislature of Massachusetts, also, has expressed its opinion of this matter. I hold in my hand an authentic copy of resolutions adopted by the General Court of that State, approving the principles of the bill now before Congress for the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands of the United States among the several States of the Union, and requesting her representatives in Congress to use their exertions to procure the passage of that bill.

These resolutions do not come to my colleagues or to myself in the shape of authoritative command. They do not emanate from the constituent People, whose instructions the Constitution of my State requires me to receive; but from a body which stands in the same relation to the People that I do, as intrusted with a share of public power for a limited time, and for specific purposes. Their sentiments, however, concur with my own conscientious opinions of right in this particular; and I rejoice, therefore, that I can honorably justify the resolutions in my place here. It is for this object I have now risen. It would have been satisfactory to me if some one of my colleagues had stepped forward to discharge this duty; but as no other gentleman has taken the floor, and as I feel that our Legislature may well claim this office at our hands, I shall endeavor to perform the task; embracing this occasion of the pendency of the resolutions from Kentucky, in the assurance that I am not likely to have any direct opportunity to discuss those of Massachusetts.

The course pursued by the Legislature of Massachusetts differs from that of some other States. Resolutions are now before us from the State of Kentucky, recommending a division among the States of the proceeds of public lands; the State of Maine has sent hither resolutions in favor of appropriations for the public defence; Massachusetts has kept both objects in view. At the same time that she transmits to her representatives her approbation of the principle of the bill for distributing the proceeds of the public lands, she transmits, likewise, resolutions in favor of a branch of the public defence, committing her to the system of fortifications upon the Atlantic. She has not given her sanction to one of these measures, to the exclusion of the other. And, in my judgment, this is

the true view of the whole subject. If there be any set of persons in this House, who are for squandering the revenue on fanciful projects of pretended public defence for the mere purpose of depleting the national treasury, them I oppose. And if there be any set of persons, who would abate one jot of the appropriations called for by the general service, in order to divert a larger share of the public treasure into the coffers of the several States, them also I oppose. Neither of these opposite purposes, if such purposes exist, is just or patriotic; and each of them, whatever party they are of, I do utterly renounce and abjure. I think the two objects, held in view by the State of Massachusetts, are perfectly reconcilable; as I shall endeavor to show in the remarks I intend to submit to the House.

The constitutionality of the proposed distribution of the proceeds of the public lands, of which I entertain no doubt, I shall not at this time undertake to discuss. Nor shall I, on the present occasion, trouble the House with recapitulating the ordinary arguments in support of the measure.

Supposing it to be constitutional, and supposing it to be commended by various considerations of expediency, which are familiar to the minds of gentlemen, and are in themselves undeniable, what I propose to examine is, the practicability and propriety of the measure as a question of finance, having regard to the other paramount demands of the public service.

And, in the view I take of the subject, it is not material to ascertain what portion of the public treasure is to be deemed the net proceeds, strictly speaking, of the public lands. Practically considered, the surplus revenue on hand is *one thing*, though derived from different sources, being, at the present time, chiefly the sale of public lands and customs. If the distribution-bill passes, it will take from the Treasury neither lands nor duties; but money. The express design of the bill, to be sure, is to distribute the net proceeds of the public lands; and that design is important, in fixing the just amount to be distributed, as also in reference to the grounds and inducements of the measure. But there is a preliminary question, which rides over all others; and that is, whether in fact there be any surplus treasure, over and above the public wants, and available for the purpose of distribution. To this question I address myself; and to resolve it, I shun all the details of the distribution-bill, and prepare to take a systematic review of the public service, of the state of the Treasury, the probable demands upon it, and the extent of its resources. Though such a view of the matter be on the face of things somewhat broad, it is the only one capable of leading the mind to any clear and satisfactory results upon the great question.

In the course of argument I have marked out to myself, I aspire to ascend above the mists of party expediency and local jealousy; to look at the subject as neither of party nor of place, neither of personal interests nor of sectional interests, neither of Administration nor of Opposition; and to sketch a brief, though general and comprehensive, outline of the present resources and exigences of the public service, in the spirit which the dignity of the subject demands of me as a statesman and an American.

And allow me to premise, in explicit terms, and in distinct explan-

ation of my conduct, or this or any other question, that I purposely withhold myself from the agitation of mere party topics in this House. Wherein the Administration shall have failed to redeem the pledges by which it gained possession of power, I leave it to those, who feel aggrieved in that respect, to assert their griefs, and to pursue, here or elsewhere, the line of controversy proper to their particular circumstances. Without presuming or intending to question the part any other gentlemen take, I may be permitted to say, that my ambition is, and my aim shall be, so long as I have a place here, and whenever I am indulged with a hearing, to speak to the business of the House. It is the course dictated to me by my own judgment: it is a course consonant with the wishes of my constituents. The political fortunes of Massachusetts are not to be marred, nor are they to be mended, by any mere party speeches, which her representatives might utter in this House.

Permit me further to say, once for all, that nothing is to be inferred from this in impeachment of my consistency. It has been matter of amusement to me, rather than of anger, to perceive myself loudly denounced by certain portions of the newspaper-press, for abstaining, in a document on the politics of Massachusetts, which I had occasion some time since to publish, from the gratuitous application of terms of personal obloquy to the constitutional heads of the present Administration. I do not complain. Least of all, in this House. The fashion of vituperating here the newspaper-press, is one that I disapprove. It is either going too far, or not far enough. If it becomes the members of this House to take notice of the individual conductors of the press, it behooves us to do it on fair terms, as men and as citizens, and not from the vantage-ground of this our high official position. Its remarks on us are our own personal affair, not the constitutional business of this body. Besides, something is to be pardoned to the spirit of liberty. I value the freedom of the press so much, that I am slow to quarrel even with its license, when the conduct of public servants is in question. We, who move in these agitated scenes, voluntarily expose ourselves to the scrutiny of the press. If we cannot sustain its examination we deserve to fall. And, for myself, I feel that, having been from the outset to this hour the steady opponent of the present Administration, I have a right, in these latter days, to judge of measures on their merits, and where I condemn to condemn with temper and moderation. As I preferred no orisons to the rising orb, and gazed on its noontide lustre with undazzled eye, I may well continue to contemplate it calmly as it hastens to its setting. In a word, I will not suffer myself to be taxed with ulterior purposes.

Nor is any imputation to be cast on the fair fame of Massachusetts. She has nailed her flag to the mast. There will it fly, amid sunshine and storm alike, proudly to the end, though it have to 'stream like the thunder-drift against the wind.' There is in her neither variability nor shadow of change. Whatever allurements may cross her path,

—Th' imperial votaress passes on,
In maiden meditation, fancy free.

She yields herself only to the voice of duty and affection. She has refused to be seduced by the blandishments of the charmer, charm he never so wisely: no force could ravish from her the priceless jewel of her undefiled

virginity. Her untainted purity has never humbled itself in the dust to receive the embrace of power, though it should have descended upon her, like Jove to the arms of Danae, in a shower of gold. Her opponents have set themselves down in perpetual leaguer by her camp; but have never gained entrance within its lines, except in an hour of truce, to receive the hospitalities due to a gallant foe. And if, in the contest for constitutional liberty, it be her destiny to stand alone, alone will she stand, self-poised, like the solid earth itself, in her own elemental principles. In resolving to adhere to Daniel Webster as her candidate for the Presidency, she has acted without *arrière pensée* or indirection whatever. She simply moves right onward in the march of consistency and honor, unshaken, unseduced, unterrified; she does justice to her own great citizen and to herself; she proposes for the Chief Magistracy that individual, in whom she sees her political principles personified; and she leaves the event to the gracious disposal of an allwise God.

Having cleared the way of those preliminary matters, I now proceed to the business on which I have arisen to address the House.

My theory of taxation is very simple. It is that of the Constitution. The revenue should be commensurate with the wants of the country, and levied for the limited uses which the Constitution prescribes. Congress cannot raise money for any other object. But, in the details of taxation, and especially in the imposition of duties on imports, we have full right, and it is our duty, so to apportion them as to encourage and sustain the domestic industry of the country.

Whether the precise provisions of the present tariff have tended to increase or diminish the amount of public treasure, I do not stop to inquire. It is founded in a compromise, which every consideration of the great interests of the country, and of the honor of its public men, requires to be respected. I rejoice that, in all the debates of this Congress, no gentleman has ventured to call this in question. The President, also, in his annual message of this year, and the Secretary of the Treasury in his report, have expressed the desire of the Administration to maintain the principle of the tariff-act of 1833 in violate. And therefore I cannot but express my surprise that the honorable chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means (Mr. CAMBRELENG) should, on a recent occasion, have spoken of that act as oppressive to the interests of agriculture and labor. Representing, as I do, some of the principal manufacturing communities in the United States, I feel bound to make a passing remark on this subject.

Whatever tends to diversify the objects of human industry, and to enlarge the scope of any one branch of industry, is not only beneficial to the interests of a country directly in that particular, but it is also beneficial in the prosperity it adds to all other departments of labor. Such has been the general effect of the introduction and growth of manufacture in this country. And it seems passing strange to pretend any exception to the general law of industry at this particular season, when the laborer receives better wages than at any past time, and when the agriculture of the country is in a state of palmy prosperity altogether without parallel in our history. Every thing which the land-owner sells is dear; those articles of manufacture, which he has occasion to buy, are cheap. The high prices, which now prevail, are not so much of things generally, as of the products of the

earth. Corn, sugar, cotton, beef, pork, tobacco, in fact, all the great staples of agriculture, have risen in price disproportionately to manufactured commodities. Very singular and extraordinary incidents in trade are the consequence of this state of things. Thus, I have been assured that a cargo of Indian corn was lately imported into the United States from the city of Venice, and sold at a profit; a thing wholly unprecedented in our commerce. Thus, also, beans have gone from France to the West Indies, and been purchased there, to be imported into and sold in the United States. It is notorious, indeed, that breadstuffs, and other ordinary products of agriculture, are dearer in this country at the present time than in the foreign markets of the Baltic, the Mediterranean, or even of England. And the prices of the great staples of the South bear similar evidence to the general prosperity of agriculture. And if there be one man so faithless on this subject, that he must see and feel in order to believe, let him go into any of the regions of country in which manufactories have been established under the influence of the protecting system; and he will then have ocular demonstration, in the spectacle of universal prosperity about him, of what that system has done for the interests of the land-owner. I hope, therefore, to hear no more suggestions calculated to unsettle public confidence in the compromise-act. Let us, for a few years at least, be able to anticipate some continuance of stability and consistency in the treatment of the vast and invaluable manufactures of the United States.

While I start, then, with the avowal of a disposition to hold the national expenditures within the uses provided by the Constitution, I also maintain that, if a proposed expenditure be constitutional, and if it be warranted by considerations of justice and public policy, the expenditure should be appropriate to the object. There is no other true and wise economy. If a thing is to be done, let it be well done, and with adequate means. Limit the constitutional uses, be frugal, but not parsimonious, in application to the uses which are constitutional!

At this moment, the financial condition of the United States is altogether remarkable. We have discharged, or stand ready to discharge, the entire funded debt of the Revolution, and that of the second war with Great Britain. We possess an overflowing treasury. These facts are alluded to every day. But is the whole force of the case fully understood? It is not merely the discharge of so much debt in money, which distinguishes the present crisis. We issued from the war of the Revolution loaded with pecuniary obligations, contracted in the pursuit of independence. Worse than this. We came out of that struggle, encumbered with treaty-engagements, entangled in onerous relations, either of fear or favor, to nations of Europe. What calamities this fact was capable of bringing upon us, we saw plainly enough in the wars of the French Revolution. Pending that disastrous series of events, that general overturning of the civilized world, it was impossible for us to favor one foreign country without offending another, and impossible to be neutral without encountering the enmity of all the contending nations. Our commerce became the common object of universal rapacity. We were despoiled on every sea, and in every quarter of the globe. But a day of retribution was to come. Having chastised in arms that foe, from whom we suffered most, we have exacted of each of the others, of Spain, Denmark, Naples, France, in-

demnification for the losses of our pillaged citizens. There remains unadjusted a trifling claim on the Netherlands; except in regard of which, we have had a general reckoning with Europe. They are beginning, on the other side of the ocean, to learn our power, and to appreciate our destinies. Now, we start fair with the world in the race of civilization, of greatness, and of virtue. We feel the young giant's strength in our limbs. Fear, we never knew; and we have passed through all the hours of anxiety that attend on a nation's beginnings. This, therefore, is the true character of the present epoch in our history; admonishing us to pause in our career, and to look before and after, for the shaping out of a policy suited to the great crisis.

It is admitted on all hands that we have a surplus of revenue; that is, the expenditures of the last year have not equalled its receipts. Of this, we had official information from the Secretary of the Treasury, and from the President himself, at the commencement of the session. No man, of either side of the House, pretends to deny it. The available amount, however, is a subject of much controversy. By some, it is rated at so low a sum as to be unworthy of distribution; by others, it is exaggerated to vast millions.

It is easy to see how all this contrariety of opinion has arisen. In the first place, gentlemen have been actuated by adverse motives, which have colored, if they have not confounded, all their perceptions of fact. Next, there is a great variety of schemes and plans of expenditure broached in one or the other House of Congress, by presenting which in a body, without discriminating what is likely to be adopted from what is certain to be rejected, there appears an appalling aggregate of appropriation. Some gentlemen would have us reckon appropriations, which are to cover a series of years, as all chargeable in the sum total to the revenues of the current year. And above all, the general practice which prevails in the House, of blending together the past and the present year, and of not distinguishing between the income of the two years separately, and the expenditure chargeable on each, is a most fruitful source of uncertainty, error, and exaggeration.

Of the detailed estimates which have been given to the country, in elucidation of the subject before us, the most elaborate is that of an honorable Senator from New York, (Mr. WRIGHT,) in his remarks upon the distribution-bill. It would be improper for me to make that speech the object of a distinct reply. Nor is there need of it. We in this House have had a similar view of the financial condition of the country, from the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, (Mr. CAMBRELENG.) In proceeding to present to the House my own conclusions, adverse to that gentleman's, it is due in candor to him to say, that I do not perceive in his calculations any evidence of a desire to mislead the House in this matter. I differ with him in the details, and in the result. But he frankly lays before us the items of supposed expenditure, according to his views of the public service, with the grounds of his conclusions. I shall do the same. Let the House judge between our respective estimates, wherever there is conflict of opinion or fact.

To avoid all possible error, I shall begin by settling up the affairs of the year 1835. It left a surplus of income in the Treasury. What is the amount of that surplus?

We had in the Treasury, at the end of last year, of available funds	\$25,523,986
The appropriations authorized prior to that time, but not expended, deducting the sum applicable to the service of this year, the sum to be transferred to the surplus fund, and for claims on account of the public debt, are	8,673,072

Leaving a clear balance of undisputed surplus amounting to \$16,850,914

To this should be added the interest of the United States in the stock of the United States Bank. The chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means rejects this, because he apprehends that the Bank intends to compel the Government to seek it only through the avenue of a suit in chancery. He might as well refuse to credit to the Treasury, any of the cash in the deposit banks. If they choose to be refractory, the Government can obtain its funds on deposit only by means of a suit against them or their sureties. I cannot believe that the United States Bank entertains the purpose imputed to it. If it does attempt to withhold from the United States our whole capital stock, whether in order to try the question of damages on the protested bill of exchange on France, or for any other object, I, as a Member in opposition, and as a firm supporter of the Bank in the question of the removal of the deposits, hesitate not to declare my belief that in so doing the Bank will justly expose itself to the united indignation of the whole country. I do not credit this suggestion. And charging against the actual value of the stock, the amount of the navy-pension-fund, being \$619,000, and also the question of damages, if gentlemen please, I set down the par of the stock as available to the Treasury; and adding this to the surplus already found, we have the following aggregate surplus on hand at the beginning of the year:

Cash on deposit, net balance,	\$16,850,914
Stock in the United States Bank,	7,000,000
Total balance of 1835,	<u>\$23,850,914</u>

Thus far there can be no material mistake. Supposing the Government to have expired with the last year, it would have possessed, independently of unexpended appropriation, so much *bank-property* in stock or deposits, susceptible of distribution among the States.

Now, if the income of the year 1836 equals the expenditures and obligations of the year, ordinary and extraordinary, it is plain that the ascertained balance of the last year will rest untouched. If the income falls short of the expenditures, the deficiency must be charged to that balance, and will reduce it. If the income exceeds the expenditure, there will be a net balance of the budget of this year to be added to the balance of the last. The next step in the inquiry, therefore, is to ascertain the probable income of 1836, and its probable expenditure.

Without consuming the time of the House by detailed explanation of any grounds of opinion as to the future resources of the Treasury, I shall content myself with presenting a few obvious *data*, upon which I myself proceed.

I find that the actual receipts into the Treasury for the first quarter of

the present year, as officially made known to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury, are as follows :

From customs,	-	-	-	-	-	\$5,006,050
From public lands,	-	-	-	-	-	5,439,650
From miscellaneous sources,	-	-	-	-	-	280,000

Total to March 31st	-	-	-	-	-	<u>\$10,725,700</u>
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If the receipts for the remaining three quarters of the year should continue to be in the same ratio, the total income of the year 1836 will amount to 42,902,800 dollars. Will the receipts be in the same ratio? Will the customs fall off? Will the sales of public lands diminish? Will either of these increase?

Of the customs, I cannot anticipate any large reduction. The average annual receipts into the Treasury under this head, from 1817 to 1835 inclusive, have amounted to twenty-one millions of dollars. It is now, at the end of this period, pretty much what it was in the beginning, though it has fluctuated very much in the intervening years. Judging from these facts, and from the activity of our foreign commerce during the five months of the year which have already elapsed, I think it reasonable to rate the customs of the year, at little, if any, short of twenty millions.

It would be rash for me to think of estimating the probable amount of sales of public lands for 1836, as of my own knowledge. I find that well informed gentlemen from the West are of opinion it will reach fifteen millions of dollars. And it may not be immaterial to note that the official journal of the Administration, in commenting on the distribution-bill, seems to rate the proceeds of the public lands at twenty millions for this, and also for the ensuing year.

Stating the entire revenue of 1836 at thirty-five millions, I shall at least keep considerably within the bounds assumed by all those gentlemen who have spoken on my side of the question.

The next inquiry is, what will be the sum total of appropriations for the current year?

To follow up this inquiry understandingly, I shall take the estimates of the Secretary of the Treasury as the basis of my calculation. He proposes appropriations to the amount of 17,515,933 dollars. Many of the items are beyond the accustomed annual appropriations. For example, those appertaining to the navy. For the sake of simplicity and perspicuity, however, I shall designate his estimate as the ordinary appropriation for the service of 1836; and all items of appropriation not included in it, I shall call extraordinary, and add to its amount, so as to make up the grand total of appropriations for the year.

It is unnecessary to occupy the ear of the House with particular observations, in this place, upon such branches of appropriation as have actually passed Congress. They will appear in the general estimate, which I shall hereafter present.

Nor shall I trouble the House in reference to every object of expensiture, reasonable or unreasonable, which any member of either House may have proposed or imagined. It will suffice to dwell upon those appropriations, which will assuredly pass in one form or another, and of which the amount only is matter of question.

Of private claims, there is a great number in the hands of various committees, or already reported upon in both Houses. Most of them are of small amount; and the aggregate is hardly worth reckoning in the calculation I have in hand. I am assured by the candid and intelligent chairman of the Committee of Claims, (Mr. WHITTLESEY,) who understands the whole subject intimately, that, if those claims on the Treasury be considered to the amount of 100,000 dollars, it will be making an ample allowance on their account.

There are three objects of importance before the House, namely, the claims of individuals despoiled by France prior to 1800; a bill for extending the provisions of the revolutionary pension acts; and a bill for granting pensions to certain persons who served in the wars of the West against the Indians previous to the treaty of Greenville; which, if they should pass, would occasion considerable drafts on the Treasury. Being earnestly in favor of the first, I regret that there is no better prospect of its being definitively acted upon at the present session. If, as I hope, the other two should pass, they would not become chargeable to any great extent on the revenues of the current year.

Of the uncertain items of expenditure, the largest is that in execution of Indian treaties, including additions made to the appropriation-bill for the Indian service, stated by the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means at \$8,767,325. Most of this, I presume, arises under the treaty with the Cherokees. That treaty is not before the House in any shape; it has not yet been made public; and we do not yet know how much it will take immediately from the Treasury. I rely, however, on the veracity and knowledge of the chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs on the part of the Senate (Mr. WHITE,) who, in a speech of his now before me, declares that not much of the expenditure under this head will or can fall in this or even the next year; and that the new resources, to be thus obtained, will nearly, if not quite, equal the increased expenditure.

There is a harbor-bill, containing numerous items; together with bills for projected custom-houses, hospitals, light-houses, and other public works; and a number of miscellaneous objects of a similar class; the final amount of which can only be stated conjecturally in round numbers.

There is a bill before this House, reported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which authorizes the Treasury Department to anticipate the payment of the indemnities due to citizens of the United States from Naples and France. This bill has been treated, in conversation or in debate, as an *expenditure* of the money of the United States. Not so. It is but an advance, to be repaid with interest; a temporary investment; a substitution of securities yielding a profit for securities yielding none; and instead of diminishing, it would, if passed, increase the eventual resources of the Treasury. I shall not, therefore, consider this bill as any charge on the revenue of the year.

All the remaining unascertained items of public expenditure, those which are chiefly debated as in competition with the plan of distributing a share of the public treasure among the States, have relation to the defence of the country. This part of the subject deserves a careful examination, as well for its intrinsic importance, as for the large masses of money, which it is proposed to appropriate, the present year, to military objects.

The primary duty of the United States undoubtedly is, to secure the means of self-defence suited to her magnitude, her condition, her destinies, and to the situation of the rest of the world. Interrogate the past. What was the main purpose for which the Colonies confederated together? History shall tell you, it was to maintain in armor the sovereignty and independence of the country and the liberties of its inhabitants, against foreign enemies. The Constitution shall tell you, which, in the very first clause of the enumeration of powers conferred on Congress, made it our earliest business to pay the debts of the United States, so as to redeem our faith and honor pledged to those who had furnished us with the sinews of war in the great struggle of the Revolution, and to give to us a fair and honorable standing in the great family of nations; and which made it our next business, and before all others, to provide for the common defence of the United States.

In assuming this position, and in supporting all reasonable measures for the defence of the country, I act in conformity with the universal wish of the people of my State. The motto on her escutcheon speaks for itself. *Ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem.* By the sword we achieved, and by the sword we maintain, our nationality as a people. To see that the country be prepared for self-defence, is a policy, which as well her sages of the Revolution, as all her living Chief Magistrates, have earnestly enjoined. One of them, my distinguished colleague, who usually sits at my side, and who so long occupied the executive chair of Massachusetts with honor to himself and advantage to the State, has more than once avowed such opinions during the present session. And the two eminent individuals, who successively left this House to fill his place, have,—with their colleagues, and especially that one of them now in my eye, unsurpassed among his countrymen in the honors of public service,—been zealous in the same cause. I do but tread in the steps of those who have gone before me. Putting our feet in the tracks of our fathers, it has been well said, we shall neither stumble nor wander. We have always favored the policy of maritime armaments. Shall we change our views on the subject, because they accord with those of the Administration? I cannot, and I will not, in a question of appropriating money for the public defence, stop to inquire by what party the expenditure of it is to be controlled. If the appropriation comes before me in a constitutional shape, and I am satisfied of its intrinsic propriety, I shall vote for it; wishing, to be sure, that my political friends held the direction of public affairs, but meaning still not to impede the constitutional action of the Government.

Another thing. There is a prevalent error on the subject of our foreign relations, bearing materially upon the question of public defence, which has been spoken of in debate on this floor, and requires to be corrected. It has been said that for us to make preparation for war would in itself afford a justificatory cause to another nation, with which we might have an open controversy, either to make war on us, or to seize, embargo, or confiscate the effects of our citizens abroad or on the high seas. A very mistaken idea. Undoubtedly this fact may be found, in the history of modern nations, to have been made on some occasion the pretext of war, as may a hundred other frivolous or inadequate things; but such a procedure would be contrary to what is now the established and ad-

mitted rule of the civilized world. It is one of the incidents of sovereignty, an inherent power essential to its own preservation, that a state should have plenary right of defence and of arms, except in so far as it may have limited that right by special convention. In virtue of this right, a nation may make all sorts of armament, assemble and organize armies, fleets, and troops of whatever description, prepare artillery and other arms, construct fortifications in the interior or upon its frontier, form camps, conclude treaties of alliance and subsidy, and muster its whole physical force in the field. In such case, if any other nation deems itself menaced by such preparations, the established course is for the latter to demand explanation. The refusal of such explanation, an equivocal or haughty answer to a temperate request for it, gives just cause of distrust, of counter-armament, and sometimes even of violences and of war, thus undertaken for the purpose of striking first, in anticipation of the impending adverse blow. To this effect are all the text-writers on international law. To this effect is every day's practice in the diplomatic intercourse of the jealously watchful nations of Europe.

One thing more. The principle, it has been said, involved in the system of public defence now before the country, is the same which was professed by the federal party at the close of the last century. It is not very profitable to discuss that point. Our business in this House is rather to make history, than to settle its controverted points. Our function here is that of statesmen, not of antiquarians. Thus much I hold to be certain, that, if the policy of sustaining an efficient system of public defence was federalism in 1799, it was republicanism in 1813; and in my humble opinion it is patriotism and wisdom at all times. If I am called to pronounce judgment on the train of events, which characterized those respective eras of 1799 and 1813, one of which happened before I saw the light, and the other in my boyhood, I feel that I am competent to regard each with the impartial eyes of posterity, and to speak its voice. Let us hold ourselves above being deluded by the jargon of party newspapers, which seek to keep stale the party animosities of past times by the misapplication of ancient names. Words are not seldom divorced from the bonds of matrimony with the things they belonged to in other days. Each of the great parties, which once divided the nation, committed errors to be atoned for at the bar of the country and of posterity. Each of them had its atoning virtues. Who believes that George Washington, John Adams, and Alexander Hamilton, on the one side, or that Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe on the other, were enemies of their country? Not I, for one; and whatever party names may be current about me, I fear that in such unbelief I shall be likely to live and to die. Both parties erred, at one time or another, in the degree of its opposition to measures required for the security of the national honor. Shall we never be warned by example? Never grow wise by experience? Instead of losing ourselves in the attempt to arrest the flitting shadows of the past, let us look to the duties of the present, and the necessities of the future, and prepare against when the time comes to act.

These things being understood, the question recurs, what are the military exigencies of the public service at the present moment?

To arrive at any approximate solution of this problem, we must examine the relations of the United States with nations or races not of our own land, whether they be situated beyond sea or on this continent.

Our relations with all the governments of the Old World are at this moment of the most amicable character. We have a pending difference with Great Britain, in regard to our northeastern boundary, which has been too long procrastinated, and demands to be brought to a speedy issue; but, notwithstanding this, the generous, the magnanimous part, borne by that government in the recent negotiations with France, affords an ample guaranty of the mutual friendliness of intention, which animates the councils of Great Britain and the United States. We have unsettled claims against Holland, for spoliations in the time of Napoleon; and against Holland, or Belgium, or both, for the destruction of American property at Antwerp in 1830, during the bombardment of that city by the Dutch forces in the citadel and on the Scheldt. With exception of these particulars, I am not aware of any subsisting difference between the United States, and either of the trans-atlantic powers. And there is manifestly nothing in these facts to affect the military policy of the United States.

The attitude of the United States, as they now present themselves to the eyes of Europe, is one creditable to our honor, and auspicious to our future peace. Our controversy with France has at length reached the crisis of a final and favorable issue, by the payment, on her part, of the instalments of indemnity due to us by the treaty of 1831, and so long withheld. And the result cannot fail to strengthen us on the side of Europe.

For myself, I can truly say that I never believed that controversy would end in war. My mind steadily repelled any such conclusion. When the cloud overhanging our prospect was at the darkest, there was abundant cause to foreknow it would soon give place to the returning light of day. Right, feeling, interest, all combated in behalf of the United States.

Whether the ministers of the United States did or did not exhibit adroitness, good temper, diplomatic skill, in the negotiations with France, is a thing which it is neither profitable nor reasonable to debate in this connexion. Our national cause is not to be adjudged upon such incidental points. Suffice it for me that, on the merits of the question, the right and justice lay on the side of the United States, the wrong and injustice on the side of France. Hers was the original injury. Hers was the protracted delay of reparation, which aggravated the original injury. Hers was the added injustice of seeking to shun or adjourn the execution of the treaty of indemnity, by the interposition of impossible conditions in reference to a matter subsequent to, and independent of, the engagements of the treaty itself. For this, in my judgment, and not the consideration whether an executive message to Congress is a purely domestic fact, was the strong point in our case. The message, of which France complained, was aside from, and independent of, the treaty. Whether it was injurious to the honor of France or not,—whether France had or had not a right to find fault with it,—she had no right, in justice or in honor, to make it a pretext for refusing or delaying the execution of engagements already unreasonably delayed. If aggrieved by the message, she should have come forward, and in the indignant spirit of true gallantry, fulfilled her own promises; and then, if she wanted to quarrel on a punctilio, but not sooner, would have been the time for her to discuss whether her wounded dignity required an explanation of the

terms of the message. In adopting such a course, she would have had the moral force of opinion in her favor; in rejecting it, she threw away the only chance in her hand. I repeat, therefore, that the merits of the question were too decidedly with us to admit of the supposition of war.

To the same effect was the feeling of the two nations. In the United States we all know there was no desire of war with France. And I avail myself of this opportunity to repel a base calumny, in reference to the views of the manufacturers of the North, which made its appearance at a time when this question was most nicely balanced. They were said to incline to war from considerations of interest. The imputation was a foul falsehood, and as groundless as foul. They, in common with all the rest of the nation, anxiously desired a pacific termination of our difficulties with France. There goes much preparation of feeling to bring on war between two nations, associated by relations of amity and advantage. It needs deep irritation to rouse the instinct of fight, of which there is doubtless enough in us, and the taste of blood to madden the passions of men. Nothing of this existed either here or in France, where, as I know from intimate experience, we Americans are a favored people. And the reason is very obvious. Apart from considerations of interest, France and the United States are united by historical sympathies; by the glorious memory of the battles fought by us, and the victories achieved, under a common banner; and by our respective positions, as the leading revolutionary powers, the one of Europe, the other of America.

And the considerations of interest were equally conclusive. We receive from France mere luxuries, objects of taste and fashion; she receives of us in exchange, raw products, necessaries, which, with her sales to us, are the very life-blood of her industry. One-fourth of her whole commerce is with us. Take the year 1831 as an example; the exports of France for which year amounted to 424,202,754 francs; and of this aggregate, the value of 110,351,696 francs came to the United States. France received pay for one-half of this in cotton, without which, or obtaining which at a war-price, her cotton manufactories could not stand in competition with those of other nations buying at a peace-price. Look at only two of the articles we buy of her. By the treaty of 1831, we stipulated to favor the wines of France; and, in the impulse of a warm spirit of friendship, we voluntarily extended the favor to her silks. In the year 1830, there were imported into the United States, from France, silks to the value of 3,639,079 dollars. In the four succeeding years, there was an average amount of 6,541,897 dollars; which, under the fears of an interrupted commerce, rose in 1835 to the sum of 12,129,640 dollars. There was also, an augmentation of the quantity of the wines imported from France, to the average annual amount of 100,000 gallons. And upon these two articles alone, there has been a reduction of duty during the last four years to the amount of 5,966,139 dollars in favor of France. Under these circumstances the United States could, without firing a gun, have shaken France to its very centre. It needed only that the men of this day, and the women of this day, sensitive as these last always are to the call of duty and of country, should, emulating the example set them in a corresponding case by their fathers and their mothers of the time of the war of independence, abstain, as they well might, from the use of French wines and French silks, to have filled the interior of France with ruin, if not

with insurrection. And the injury to the permanent interests of France would have been most enormous; since the wines of Portugal, Spain, Italy, Austria, and the Rhine, and the silks of England, Asia, and the Mediterranean, would have been likely to take possession of our market in lieu of those of France.

These facts, while they prove that war was at no time probable, prove also that the relations between us and France, as well as between us and Great Britain, must continue to be of the closest amity.

I congratulate France, therefore, upon the restoration of assured harmony between us. Her domestic condition is not one to be improved by a mere maritime war with America, or a war of hopeless invasion of our territory. There are too many elements of revolution at work in her own bosom. Is it known to this House, that twice, since the accession of the House of Orleans to the throne, there have been more Frenchmen under arms, engaged in battle within France itself, than would have sufficed to win the battle of Waterloo? Her government rests on the crater of a slumbering, but not extinct, volcano; which, had foreign affairs gone ill with her, might at any moment have burst forth in fury, and scattered her present rulers to the four quarters of the sky. Her 'fire-new stamp of honor' will scarce yet give currency to counterfeit coin. Her present dynasty is not quite firm enough in the saddle, to attempt to ride over the faith of treaties. Had she undertaken it, the Blazonry of Orleans might have been replaced by the Gallic cock, as that of Bourbon had been already; the tricolor, which again waves in the van of her armies and as the banner of her navies, might have been followed, as of old, by the consular fasces or the imperial eagles; and upon the ruins of the monarchy of July, there might have re-arisen, phoenix-like, the French Republic, one and indivisible, to send forth its propagandist legions on a new mission of liberty through astonished Europe. What France needs, and what she has got, is repose. She has gone through the horrors of the first Revolution, the conquests of the Republic, the glories of the Empire, and the shames of the Restoration; and her best policy now is to show that

—Peace hath its victories
No less renowned than war,—

by the development of her domestic resources and the consolidation of her institutions.

I congratulate the United States not less. To us, also, the evils of the war must have been almost incalculable. No war, however glorious its ending might be, could fail to be deeply injurious to the country. It would be followed by a train of moral and political ills of tremendous magnitude. It would occasion immense loss to the nation, in the withdrawal of its resources from the pursuits of industry, to be applied to the work of destruction. Reflect on the overflowing prosperity, which twenty years of peace have bestowed upon the United States. And, in addition to these general evils, accompanying war at all times, would have been the particular circumstances of a war at such a time, and against such a nation. Our immense commerce, scattered through every clime, our whalers, chasing their prey in the most distant seas, our richly laden ships in the East Indies and in the waters of Europe and South America, subject to be assailed by the cruisers and privateers of a power possessing

no similar commerce to be assailed by us in return. Our navy, gallant, and consecrated by victory after victory, but how much inferior in force of numbers to that of the adversary! Our fortifications, not only incomplete, but ungarnished of arms, and half dismantled, as I hope they never will be hereafter. Add to which the difficulties in the way of military operations against France. Her ships of war numerous and ready for action. Her powerful standing army. Her coast, one vast rampart of brass and iron, which, even when she had scarce a ship afloat for its defence, her navy having been annihilated by Nelson at the mouths of the Nile and off Cape Trafalgar, still defied and baffled all the attempts of England, as the disastrous expeditions of Walcheren and the Isle-du-Rhé bear witness. May our hearts run over in thankfulness to the gracious Disposer of events, that he vouchsafed to preserve us from the calamities of such a war!

And I congratulate the world. Great Britain, France, and the United States, stand together in the first rank of constitutional governments. We have no business to quarrel together. Better functions, and higher destinies, belong to us in the general scheme of earth's affairs. To cheer onward the great cause of civilization and liberty, to conquer new realms to the empire of knowledge, to march side by side as the vanguard of constitutional right in defiance of all gainsayers, to develop the social capacities of our race, these, and not the task of mutual injury, be our chosen acts. It is a fact, singular and memorable, that, for twenty years past, the world has witnessed no foreign war in the limits of Christendom: I mean, of Christian power against Christian power. The providence of God seems, for his own wise ends, to have averted such an event. All the wars of that period have been either of Christian against Infidel, or they have been wars of domestic revolution within each single country or its possessions. I rejoice that we did not make an exception to the rule. Is there not a moral in this fact? I think there is; and a moral pertinent to the case in hand.

Upon this review of our trans-atlantic relations, there is, it is plain, no specific point of immediate peril in that quarter, calling for war-preparations, and for expenditures of money in direct relation to such end. What we need in this respect is the gradual placing of the country in a posture of defence adapted less to the actual danger, than to the definable *contingencies of danger*, on the side of Europe.

Movement is the characteristic of the present epoch. It is often spoken of: has it been duly pondered, in reference to our own domestic legislation? Is it not time to do so? Is it not the part of wise men, of prudent patriots? All society is instinct with life, enterprise, competition, liberty. Nations are balanced. Foreign wars, as I have already suggested, have ceased. The world gazes on the spectacle of deeply interesting domestic struggles. That glorious Christendom, of which we compose no mean part, is moving on to some predestined, but yet unscanned, point, in the boundless future of ages. Society is rolling forward, like a planet wheeled through its orbit in the heavens. Shall we, as did the ancient astronomers, trusting to delusive appearances, imagine that our earth is the stationary centre of the system? Or shall we look into causes and effects, to discover that we are but an element of the universal whole, impelled rather than impelling, if acting, yet acted upon with intenser force? Shall we shut

our eyes, in wilful ignorance of events? Shall we fold our arms in listless indifference to the march of fate? It beseems us to look at our position; to consider its relations; to take observation of the head-lands and land-marks about us; to elevate ourselves to our destiny, if glorious; to brace ourselves to the shock, if otherwise; and to make ready for either doubtful event.

Inspecting the social and revolutionary movements of the present generation, we see that Christendom is divided into great adverse classes: the friends of improved constitutional institutions, who control America and Western Europe; and the enemies of such institutions, who are supreme in Central and Eastern Europe. The next war which divides the world, it is clearly enough perceived, will be that war of opinion, which Canning long ago foretold to come. Our position, as the leading power of the New World, is, and must be, a responsible and conspicuous one, at all events. Still more, as we are the exemplar Republic, not of America only, but of the world. For what is the petty state of San Marino, or a free city here and there in Germany, or even the narrow mountain Republic of the Swiss, compared with this vast representative Confederacy of ours, filling greater space than the whole of Europe? When collision comes, as sooner or later it will, and at what hour we know not, we shall need to be in possession of two things, alike essential to our neutrality, our safety, our existence. They are, first, a competent system of maritime defences; and, secondly, the national vigor and internal health and resources requisite for employing those means of defence to effect. Both are equally indispensable. Either without the other is naught. The weapon to ward off or to strike, the spirit and the strength to wield it,—these are the mind's picture of a free people, jealous of their independence, and resolute in the maintenance of their national rights.

Our navy, and the fortifications of the Atlantic and Gulf, constitute the co-ordinated parts of a system of maritime defence and security. Each of them sustains and is sustained by the other: the navy as the agent to repel the enemy or defend against his approach; and fortifications as the *points d'appui* of the combined forces of sea and land. Without going back to a period anterior to the last war, when this general system, and especially the navy, had to struggle with party difficulties or personal prejudices, it suffices to say, that the experience of that war put an end to all controversy respecting the value of maritime defences. Our navy had covered itself with glory. All men of all parties, and all sections of the country, gave to it their good will. It was justly remarked, that our party divisions, acrimonious as they were, ceased at the water's edge. Accordingly, on the instant after the restoration of peace, we saw three great objects simultaneously pursued by our public men: first, the re-establishment of the pecuniary credit of the Treasury; secondly, the re-organization of our system of public defences, as they are now in progress; thirdly, the development and fostering of the internal resources of the country, its commerce, manufactures, agriculture, fisheries, and mines.

As that system of public defence, which came into being, in a national point of view, with the war of the Revolution, was extended in consequence of our difficulties with France in 1798, and triumphed over all

obstacles in the war of 1813 with England, I am not sorry to see it confirmed and advanced by the apprehended event of another collision with France. Regarded as a whole, it consists of, first, a navy; second, fortifications; third, an army, kept sedulously within the regular wants of the country; fourth, an organized militia; and fifth, the naval depots, ports of refuge, arsenals, armories, and munitions of war, requisite for the service and supply of the other branches of the system. Subsidiary to which, of course, is a chain of interior communications, adapted both to the defence and to the commercial interests of the country.

There seems to be much vagueness and apprehensiveness in the minds of members on this subject. It has been very emphatically asked by the gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. C. ALLAN,) and others, whether it be the policy to cover this country with a vast military organization, like what is observed in Europe. Such is not my aim. There is no need to augment our army in the ratio of countries beyond sea, for the very reason that the Ocean divides us. And, for the same reason, we need a competent naval force, and the fortifications which are to support it, because on that ocean they and we meet. The United States are assailable by the powers of Europe only through the means of maritime approach. They must come to us. The colonial possessions on the continent of America, or in its waters, which many of them possess, do not relieve them from this difficulty. England, even, with her extensive territory on our northern frontier, has not within it, and cannot have, the resources, in men, munitions, and money, necessary to the carrying on of war against the United States. All these, to reach us with the bare point of offence, must be water-borne. Possessing competent maritime defences, we shall have our national quarrels decided upon the Ocean, instead of our own territory. Our wars will be maritime, leaving untouched all our national resources, except our foreign commerce.

Independently of the exigencies of actual war, this form of defence is of permanent importance in time of peace, for the protection of our wide-spread commerce. In regard to this commerce, there is a perfect unity of interest pervading the whole country. All its departments are inseparably interwoven together. This is plain enough so far as regards our vast and increasing coasting trade. It is not less true of other things. Take the whale fishery of the Northern States, which is pursued in the remotest waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Is not this a national interest? If you doubt, ask yourself where its products are consumed. Are they not necessities of life throughout the United States? Look at our European commerce. They are ships of the North which navigate the Atlantic; but each of them transports to Europe a cargo of tobacco or cotton, owned and produced in the South, or in the valley of the Mississippi. Is it the ship, or the cargo more valuable than the ship five times over, which needs the protection of a navy? Britain is no longer mistress of the seas. The magic of her naval ascendancy is dispelled. Prospero has lost his wand. The Ocean is hers no longer. Our hardy seamen have vindicated it as their own. We, and the other nations of the globe, our friends and allies, or our enemies, as they may choose, are now the coequal tenants in common of the great plain of waters. Our fleets ride over it at will, as their rightful pathway. Our mariners draw from its unsounded depths the rich rewards of enter-

prise and courage. And I would have it so. Never may the time again come, when the ships of the North, freighted with the wealth of the South and the West, shall be swept from the sea, as they were in the wars consequent on the French Revolution, the passive prey of the rapacity of all Europe.

Another consideration. Navies are an arm of public defence peculiarly appropriate to free governments. Was it ever known that ambitious men left the quarter-deck, which had been the scene of their triumphs and their glory, to compass the downfall of the liberties of their country? Have the brave sailors, scarred in a hundred battles, ever been found prostituting themselves to the work of elevating a victorious commander to the purple? No, these are the abuses which belong to successful armies. Sailors are ever free-hearted as they are uncalculating, and generous-minded as brave. Was it not with her wooden walls that Athens repelled the Persian? Most of the more eminent among the cultivated states of Greece, as Athens, Crete, Rhodes, were naval powers. So it was in the middle age, with the republics of Italy, which served to keep alive the expiring torch of liberty and civilization amid the surrounding darkness of barbaric invasion. I remember the remark, long ago, in the politics of Aristotle, that the sailor population of the Piræus was the freest in spirit of all the inhabitants of democratic Athens. It is Dante, I think, who in like manner characterizes the mariners of the quarter of the arsenal in Venice. And, in later times, where shall we look for some of the purest and brightest examples of power and freedom united? Is it not in Britain and the Netherlands, out of which so large a part of us have sprung, and whose policy told them to fight their battles, not on their own soil, but on the ocean?

Not long since, in debate upon another subject, an honorable gentleman (Mr. HAWES,) expressed much unwillingness to expose our seamen to the perils and hardships of an expedition to explore the Antarctic seas. I beg leave to assure that gentleman, that the hardy population, in the midst of which I was born and bred, do not stand in need of any such compassionate care. Ocean is the plaything of our childhood. We are at home on the wave as on the shore. We dally with the wind. We scorn the storm. We regard the sublime expanse of sky and sea before us with the emotions which it is fitted to inspire; but they are elevating emotions; and I know of no situation, where the instinct of man's inborn charter of liberty is more vividly present to the mind, than when bounding over mid-ocean, in a gallant ship, with the flag of one's country at her masthead. It is not in such scenes that we learn to be false to freedom or to fear danger.

In considering the relative extent of the navy, and of the fortifications associated with it, I can but do as others do, in expressing my hearty concurrence with the views of the Secretary of War, as approved by the President. I have heard strange doctrines in regard to our military men, since I became a member of this House. It seems to be thought matter of reproach, in some quarters, if an officer of the army possesses the knowledge and qualifications which liberal studies are prone to impart. I honor the Secretary of War the more, in that he adds to the qualities of a brave man and a successful commander the taste and the habit of intellectual cultivation. His report on the subject of our military defences is

worthy of his character as an officer and a statesman. As at present advised, I can scarce hesitate to vote for all such military appropriations as come within the scope of his recommendations, sanctioned as these are by the President. In elucidation of my own views on this point, I have but a single idea to suggest to the House.

Military writers of some note have doubted the expediency of attempting to fortify an extensive land-frontier. There never was any question, however, as to a sea-frontier. All experience, of all ages and all nations, has favored the latter. There is abundant reason for the distinction. An army, which invades a country by land, has the same means of retreat, as of advance. If it can maintain itself on the foreign soil by force of arms, it will do so. An army which invades by sea, needs just as much physical strength as if it came by land. In addition to all the means of attack and defence, which it must have to operate on the land, precisely as if it were a mere land-force, it is wholly dependent on ships of war, for the transportation of itself and of its munitions. Thus situated, it may land, ravage and burn, and fly back to its ships; but it cannot act permanently and efficaciously, unless its fleet possess a secure place of refuge. To obtain such a place, is of necessity its first object. Its magnitude, and consequent power, are greatly restricted by the difficulty of conveying a large army, with its equipage, supplies, and horses, across the sea, even for a short distance. Not so on the land side. There a powerful army can push itself into a contiguous foreign territory in such overwhelming numbers, as to be comparatively regardless of the fortifications scattered along the frontier. Of what avail to either party were the fortresses of Austrian or French Flanders, of the Rhine, or of Italy, in the campaigns of Napoleon? There is a still more striking case, that of the Spanish Peninsula, which illustrates both sides of the question. The Peninsula adjoins France on a part of its northern frontier. By which it has happened, that the people of the Peninsula could and did invade France at will, and at one period held for a long time a part of her southern provinces; and France has always been able to throw her armies into Spain. On its extensive maritime frontier, the Peninsula is defended, not by a continuous line of battlements covering its whole coast, but by admirable fortifications for the security of *selected points*, important in themselves, either as naval stations, or as populous wealthy sea-ports. Such is the character of the military works of Barcelona, Alicante, Carthage, Malaga, Cadiz, Lisbon, Oporto, Corunna, Bilbao, and San Sebastian. Look now at the consequence. England has been at war with Spain not unfrequently for upwards of two centuries. During the latter part of the time, she has been altogether supreme on the sea; yet she has never found it in her power to make an effective hostile lodgment in Spain, except at Gibraltar, virtually insular in situation; and a mere island fortress must of necessity yield in time to any decidedly superior naval power. It is equally true, as I remarked before, that, in modern times, when France has erected suitable fortifications for the defence of her maritime frontier, although England could land at Toulon and other points on the French coast, and although the two countries are absolutely in sight of each other, yet she could never make any headway in that direction, and was only able to succeed through alliances in Spain or the Netherlands, which gave her the advantage of action

against a land-frontier. The same thing might be largely illustrated by other examples in the history of the wars of modern Europe. While, therefore, if undefended by fortifications and a naval force, an ocean frontier affords peculiar facilities for the approach of an enemy, it presents, if adequately protected by suitable defences, peculiar facilities for resisting hostile operations. But I forbear to trespass on the patience of the House; concluding, from the whole matter, that, though it would be chimerical, an intolerable tax on the industry of the nation, and the ground of necessity for alarming additions to the regular army, to attempt to guard our immense seacoast by means of a wall of stone bristling with cannon, yet the security of our maritime frontier, in the manner and with the limitations explained by the Secretary of War, is due to the honor and to the highest interests of the United States.

Our policy is peace. We have it now, so far as regards the nations of Europe; and long may we possess it; for it places before us a future of prosperity such as the world never saw. It is our duty and our interest to say to them,—We make you the tender of our friendship, we desire your good will, we ask it, we seek it; but we seek it as an independent nation of free and brave men, conscious of their strength. Like the eagle in our coat of arms, we hold the olive branch in one hand, and the arrows of death in the other. We should continue to deprecate war as among the deadliest curses, moral, political, and economical, which could befall us; but it would be disastrous to look towards it under the panic fears of conscious imbecility. In the courage of our population, in the spirit of freedom and the patriotic nationality of sentiment which animate the country, in the vigor of character proper to us, we possess the last and best guaranty of our independence as a People. And in the course of events, much has happened to strengthen us against the hazards of war. Steam, it may be, will prove the means of a complete revolution in military operations upon our seaboard. Men and munitions can be concentrated on a menaced point with wonderful despatch by its agency. Its direct uses in war, not as applied to moveable batteries only, but in other modes of action, are as yet scarce beginning to be appreciated. Our pecuniary resources as a nation are fresh, elastic, inestimable. With such moderate and reasonable military defences as the country ought to have, and as would be unfelt in their cost by the people, we may rest secure against all the evils, or even the danger, of trans-atlantic wars. Then Europe will have added cause to say,

Still one great clime, in full and free defiance,
Yet rears her crest unconquered and sublime,
Above the far Atlantic.

Then, if her disciplined legions invade us, we need not flinch from the encounter. Could she send braver or better men than fell before the charging bayonets of Scott at Chippewa, or the unerring rifles of Kentucky and Tennessee with Jackson at New Orleans? No, not if the victors of Marengo or Jena, not if the vanquished of Vittoria or Waterloo should come, with Soult or Gérard at their head. Like the people of old Rome, in peaceful times we may retire now and then to the Aventine mount in disgust; rallying to our posts again, when the voice of our country calls. And they who cross the sea to assail us, like the waves

that spend themselves in idle fury upon our shores, will find us firm, compacted, immoveable, as the everlasting ribs of the Continent.

Such are the considerations, exclusively appropriate to the question of defences on the maritime frontier, with especial reference to the nations of Europe. The considerations, applicable to the question of interior defences, are of another class. They regard either the Indians, or the new states, into which the vast American possessions of Spain and Portugal have been resolved.

There is but one of those new nations, whose territory touches our own. Each of them, except the Mexican States, is separated from us by the sea, and, in order to reach our territory, must overcome the same difficulties of maritime assault, which defend us on the side of Europe. If protected by seaboard works, against the nations of Europe, we shall be protected against all but one of those of America. Add to which, their extreme domestic weakness, and their total destitution of the means of carrying on remote war, free us from any cause to apprehend attack of our territory from that quarter. They can reach us only through our mercantile marine, which, in case of hostilities, would be exposed to the depredations of privateers or pirates cruising under their flag. This fact offers another inducement for giving perfect efficiency to our navy, the sole arm of defence which we need, so far as regards the empire of Brazil, and the republics of South America.

The Mexican States, however, the most populous and the most efficient of the republics of Spanish America, stretch to the southwestern confines of the United States. In common with the other nations of Spanish America, and more advantageously than they, this Republic may assail our commerce in the Gulf of Mexico. On that sea it is to be met, in case of war, by naval means, and especially with armed vessels of the smaller class. It is impossible to form an opinion of the military defences proper on the land-side of that Republic, without coming at once to the train of passing events in relation to Texas.

When the first obscure tidings of the victory of San Jacinto reached us, they caused the manifestation of a lively sensibility in the debates of this House. There appeared, on the one side, a ready and eager belief in the tidings, and a disposition to acknowledge at once the independence of Texas, or to consider the alternative of its annexation to the United States; on the other side, something of distrust and doubt as to the correctness of the intelligence, and of decided opposition to any immediate action upon the grave questions involved in the subject. We of the North, it was then said, heard with no willing ears the unwelcome news of the triumph of the Texans. Never was there a greater mistake. I received the imperfect accounts of that battle with hopeful, but anxious, rejoicing, and with extreme solicitude for its truth; because I considered it as delivering us from the otherwise certain calamity of a war in the West.

I believed then, as I believe now, that there has existed, in parts of the United States, a settled purpose to sever Texas from the Mexican Republic. I knew that the commanding general of the United States on that frontier was collecting troops, and preparing, by order of his Government, to take post within the possessory limits of the province of Texas. I had reason to think the present Administration long since

treated for the cession of Texas. I saw that the individuals under arms in that province were mostly our own countrymen, carrying on war by resources wholly drawn from this country. Under these circumstances, if events were the reverse of what they prove to be, a war between the United States and the Mexican Republic would have been inevitable. I say this, without impeaching, in any sense, the good faith of our own Government. If Santa Ana had beaten or driven before him the Americans in Texas, if a victorious Mexican army had approached the banks of the Sabine or even of the Neches, whatever might be the policy or wishes of the Administration, whatever the conduct of its officers, it would have been impossible to restrain the overflowing enthusiasm of the people of the South-West, their military ardor, their sympathy in the cause of their kinsmen and fellow-citizens in Texas. I appeal to the gentleman from Kentucky just before me, (Mr. WILLIAMS,) to bear me witness, whether the young men of the West would not have taken arms and rushed to the frontier by irrepressible thousands, if they had seen the Mexicans, flushed with victory, approximating towards the borders of Louisiana. I know it; I know that the Government of the United States, if so disposed, could not have prevented it; and, therefore, I regard the victory of San Jacinto with hearty satisfaction.

Nor is this satisfaction diminished by the circumstance, that the result of that battle brings home to us the question of the future disposition of Texas. We have now reached, without a war, a point which otherwise we should have reached inevitably, ere long, through a war. Thus much is pure gain to us, in the saving of blood and of treasure. The political question, with all its difficulties, we should have had at all events. But we have no occasion, in the changed circumstances, to look to the otherwise possible, if not probable, expenditures and hazards of a war with the Mexican States.

For the rest, there can be no question of the propriety of recognising the independence of Texas, whenever that is a clearly established fact. We may do this without giving just cause of umbrage to any foreign power. The Mexicans, who obtained from us an acknowledgment of their sovereignty founded on revolution, can scarce complain of the application of the principle to the case of Texas. Its erection into a separate government, in amity with us, would interpose a neutral barrier power between us and the great body of the Mexican Republic.

The annexation of Texas to the United States is a totally different thing, involving a train of evils, as the propagation among us of a spirit of military conquest, the chances of foreign jealousy and collision, and peril to the durability of the Union itself, which I cannot contemplate without deep solicitude and repulsive dread. I will not permit myself to anticipate the appropriation by Congress of any money to the accomplishment of such an end.

Looking to the alternative of the independence of Texas as the only probable one, it greatly simplifies the question of the interior defences of the United States. We shall border on the Mexican Republic nowhere but in the extreme and yet unpeopled West. In the interior, our military organization will have relation almost exclusively to the Indians.

Whatever appropriations may be needed for the suppression of the

existing hostilities among the Seminoles and Creeks, Congress, we know, will promptly vote, as occasion requires. And it may be taken for certain that all the Indians, still remaining within the limits of any of the United States, will be speedily removed to the country provided for them beyond the Mississippi. The time has gone by, to give them any different destination. Their lot is now inevitable. Most of them, including the more numerous tribes, the Creeks and Cherokees, are under treaty to emigrate. When the emigration shall be completed, there will be,

Indians who have already emigrated	-	-	-	-	31,348
Indians to be removed	-	-	-	-	72,181
Indians of the indigenous tribes	-	-	-	-	150,341

making a total of - - - - - 253,870

collected on the western frontier of the United States. Can these Indians, a large part of them driven by us from their ancient homes, and aggregated together in spite of themselves, look with an affectionate eye towards the Government of the United States? It is impossible. Whether there will ever appear among them another Philip of Mount Hope, another Tecumseh, to rally their tribes against us, we know not; but we have ample experience, in the late contest with the Winnebagoes, and in the present attitude of the Creeks and Seminoles, to teach us the necessity of being on our guard in this matter. Concentrated as they are and will be on the borders of Arkansas and Missouri, in communication with the savage tribes of the Mexican territory, and through them with the Mexican Republic itself, and in control of the vast plains of the heart of the Continent, they have it in their power to be either highly serviceable to the frontier settlements of the United States, or deeply injurious, by the congenial warfare of those great savannahs, where men are capable of rapid change of place by means of the horse, and never want the readiest and most effective of cavalry-weapons, the lance, with which so many of the celebrated battles of Spanish America, as Bojacá, Junin, Ayacucho, have been won. To make the Indians our hearty friends, we should enter, at once, into plans of conciliation and of political fellowship, suited to the object. Meanwhile, to prepare against the contingency of war in that quarter, and to prevent even its approaches, we need a continuous line of posts along the western frontier, a *cordon militaire*, for our own defence, and for the restraint of the Indians. Whatever augmentation of the army this necessity may call for, let us grant, promptly, freely, manfully,—without being terrified from our duty by the apprehension that a regiment more or less of regular troops can affect in any way the inextinguishable devotion to liberty which inspires the American People.

For myself, I shall continue, in the discussion of this matter, to look with a steady eye to the single point of the exigencies of the public service. No secondary consideration shall distract my thoughts, no incidental objects divert my attention, from the only true question in all these cases,—that is,—what does the general interest of the country as such require? In this, I am fixed and resolved; as between us and our public enemies, to stand by the country. I would have the country right, in all its controversies:

Thrice is he armed, that hath his quarrel just.

But I would not suffer my own personal impression of the right or wrong of its cause to impel me to the abandonment of that cause. I shall give my vote, and if need be my voice, as I have hitherto done, to every appropriation, which is asked for in good faith, and sustained by reasonable evidence of its propriety. And it matters not to me, whether the money is to be expended on the banks of the Merrimac of the East or the Merrimac of the West. Still it is my country.

Entertaining these general views of the public service,—acting upon them in the votes I give in this House,—I aver that, even upon the liberal rules of appropriation which I advocate and observe, there will remain in the Treasury, at the expiration of the present year, a surplus equal to the whole revenue of ordinary years. To illustrate the fact, I subjoin the following estimate of the appropriations, probable or certain, of the present year, made conformably to the opinions I have declared.

Appropriations proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury,	\$17,515,933
Ditto, in addition to the above, in the bill for the	
civil and diplomatic service, - - -	607,250
Ditto in the navy bill, - - -	587,521
Ditto in the bill for the Indian service, - -	1,165,332
Ditto in the army bill, - - -	97,239
Advance to the cities in the District of Columbia, amount	
payable the present year, - - -	70,883
Appropriation for hostilities among the Seminoles, -	2,120,000
Ditto for hostilities among the Creeks, - -	500,000
Ditto for raising volunteers and dragoons, -	300,000
Bill for the defence of the western frontier, - -	1,000,000
House bill additional for fortifications, - - -	200,000
Appropriations for other objects in same bill, - -	882,053
House bill, additional for civil service, - - -	52,684
Private claims, - - -	100,000
Miscellaneous works of various kinds, light-houses, beacons,	
Cumberland road, public buildings, say, - -	2,000,000
Add for other possible appropriations not enumerated, -	2,801,105
	<hr/>
Total, exclusive of new Indian treaties, - - -	<u>\$30,000,000</u>

Of this sum, there will remain at the end of the year, unexpended, not less than twelve millions of dollars. It exceeded eight millions the last year. It will increase in proportion to the increase of appropriations.

On the other hand, the execution of new treaties with the Indians, will call for an appropriation to the amount of \$6,259,241, which, for reasons heretofore stated, I do not consider it necessary to charge to the income of the current year.

Such is the result of my reflections on this important subject. I have treated it in good faith, actuated by a sincere wish to arrive at the truth, and especially to avoid all exaggeration as to the available surplus in the Treasury. The sum is large. It cannot be disguised or denied. No part of the surplus of 1835 can be reached by the expenditure of 1836. On the contrary, there is abundant reason to believe that, without speak-

ing of unexpended appropriations, which cannot fall short at the end of this year of twelve millions, there will be an additional sum of unappropriated surplus of the revenue of 1836, to be added to the balance of credit from the last year.

I demand of the members of this House what is to be done with this great treasure? Shall it continue in the hands of the deposite banks, safe or unsafe, to be loaned by them for the benefit of individuals, yielding no advantage to the people of the United States?

We propose to you, on the one hand, the distribution-bill. We say that, in principle, it is a just, wise, and proper measure. If it contemplates too large a distribution, diminish the sum. Leave in the Treasury all that is needed for the common defence and general welfare of the Union. Of that I would not touch a dollar. But the residue, place in the hands of the States; restore it to the People themselves; let it be applied to the objects of local improvement, which may or may not fall within the scope of the constitutional power of Congress, but which are all-important to the prosperity and the strength of the United States.

If the distribution-bill comes in conflict with the graduation-bill, cannot the two objects be combined, thus reconciling and conciliating the rights of the old States, and the interest of the new ones?

If neither of these things may be done, if it does not comport with the political views of the majority of this House to make an absolute donation of the surplus treasure to the several States,—if there be a constituent ingredient of this legislature, not a member of the House, not a member of the Senate, whose possible action upon this subject gentlemen can suffer themselves to anticipate, so as to be affected thereby,—then I ask the House whether this surplus treasure may not be placed in the respective State treasuries in the form of a deposite or loan? Such a measure would be infinitely less exceptionable than to have the Government of the United States come into the market as a great speculator in stocks, less than to retain the public treasure in the deposite banks at a clear loss of two or three millions of interest, perhaps in part of the principal; less than to squander it in mere idle wastefulness.

I believe in my conscience that a distribution of the surplus revenue ought to be made. The country demands it. The public interest demands it. I do not urge any plan for the disposition of the public money in the spirit of party agitation. Nay, if I sought a topic of party agitation out of this House, a means of rousing the just indignation of the People, I should wish for nothing better than to have Congress adjourn, by the will of the majority, leaving the public treasure dispensed among favored persons or corporations, to be used or abused at the discretion of the Administration. Will the majority of the House give to the Opposition such a manifest advantage? Will they not rather consult their interest and their public duty, by consenting to the passage of some law, either of grant or of deposite, which may place a portion of the surplus revenue in the control or custody of the respective States? I exhort them by every consideration of interest, I adjure them by every consideration of duty, not to suffer this session of Congress to terminate, leaving the public treasure unguarded, neglected, abandoned. Let us beware of this great wrong to the People and the States we represent.

With these remarks, it would have given me satisfaction to be able to

close what I might wish to say on the subject of these resolutions. But there is one other topic, which shows itself in the speeches of prominent friends of the land-bill, and which I cannot pass unnoticed. I mean, the suggestion, that the North enjoys more than a due share of the advantages of the Union. It was very distinctly averred by the gentleman from Kentucky, who preceded me, (Mr. GRAVES,) as an argument in favor of the distribution-bill, that the State of New York had received more of the public revenue than I know not how many of the States of the South and West, which he enumerated; that the North and North-East were made rich by the public expenditures; in contrast with which, was arrayed the liberality of the State of Kentucky towards the manufactures and commerce of the Atlantic States. The gentleman frankly admitted, that he had not made any exact calculations on the subject. It would have been well, I think, had he looked into the figures carefully; because, had he done so, he would have ascertained that there is no foundation in fact, for such grave charges in denial of the general and impartial value of the union of these States.

I take leave to say, we have heard something too much of the same tenor from the State of Kentucky, throughout the present session of Congress; and, if it were in order, I should say, in both its chambers. To me, a new member of the House, little versed, of course, in the details of its debates, few things have seemed stranger than the idea, so pertinaciously insisted on, that appropriations are to be made, not where the public service requires them, but in *shares* to the several States. At an early period of the session, after having heard such things more than once, a strong sense of their injustice drew from me a few observations, somewhat warmer, it may be, than gentlemen were accustomed to hear from the North. If I could suppose that, under the impulses of the moment, I overstepped the limits of manly controversy, I should be sorry for it. Certain I am, on ample reflection, and after deliberate investigation of the details of the question, that I did not go one hair's breadth beyond the truth, in the terms of condemnation, which I applied to these reproaches on the States of the Atlantic, and especially the East. I spoke, to be sure, strongly, as I felt. Doubtless, members from other States are attached to their homes. So am I to mine. I can conceive that gentlemen should feel indignant, if they thought their State unjustly assailed: cannot they conceive that I should, also, if my State be unjustly assailed? Or is it imagined, that members from the East are to kiss the rod that is raised to strike? Do so, they who list. I desire friendship with every member of this House. But I have rights to maintain here, my own and those of my constituents; and I shall not shrink from any issue, which their vindication may involve.

Deeming this question of the last importance, in its general bearing on the stability and tranquil action of the Government of the Union, I have taken some pains to probe the matter to the bottom. If the result of my inquiries were other than what it is, it would not be stated to the House. Some time since, a gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. THOMPSON,) presented a variety of calculations, tending to show that the North was favored to the injury of the South. That gentleman was answered, and he will permit me to say, with all due respect, triumphantly answered, by the gentleman from Maine, (Mr. EVANS,) the gen-

tleman from Virginia, (Mr. GARLAND,) and another gentleman from Maine, (Mr. JARVIS.) My view of the subject covers the whole United States. I shall demonstrate, by a detailed examination of the public expenditures in its various branches, and upon authentic documents, that there exists a striking equality in its distribution. How could it be otherwise? Witness the zeal and vigilance of members for the cause of their particular constituents. Bear in recollection the interest and the will of every Administration to keep well, so far as it may, with all sections of the country. At any rate the fact exists. I shall show it, in terms courteous, but positive, as befits the consciousness of truth; and, sectional matter as it all is, I cannot but hope the effect will be to strengthen, rather than weaken, our common attachment to the Union.

All things done by man must have a locality. Whenever the government of a country disburses money, it must be disbursed somewhere. Certain expenditures are, upon the face of them, absolutely and unequivocally national; as the charges of foreign intercourse, drawn and spent abroad. Others are apparently sectional; as the expenses of a land-office in the West, or a light-house in the East. Now, it is natural that a measure local in name should be brought forward by local interests. It must be so, in the operation of local necessities, feelings, and knowledge. I cannot admit that because the members from a particular State, or tier of States, support a measure unanimously, the fact affords ground of presumption against a measure. Who should understand and advocate a thing, if not the members from the State most immediately concerned with it? As a member of this House, I lie under particular obligation to see to the welfare of my State. That is one thing for which we are severally sent here. Shall not the Representatives from the State of Ohio feel and act unitedly in the defence of their northern frontier? Shall not the Representatives from Alabama, Georgia, and Florida take a deep interest in the measures necessary for the protection of their constituents against the hostilities of the Creeks and Seminoles? Surely. They *support* locally: we must not *reject* locally. Our decision should be national in its motives and scope, not sectional.

This whole doctrine of allotting out the public expenditures in shares is rotten to the core. Try it practically: strip it of all disguise and apply it to any familiar fact. Suppose a bill before this House, proposing to appropriate money for the defence of the southern frontier; and suppose members from the North to rise, under such circumstances, with the avowal on their lips:—We cannot gainsay the propriety of this appropriation; there is flagrant war before our eyes, for the prosecution of which this money is indispensably necessary; but we will not grant it, unless you give us a corresponding sum of money to aid in the construction of such a canal or such a rail-way, in our particular neighborhood. What would be said of this? What ought to be said? There is no language of censure, in the infinite combinations of human speech, which would be considered blasting enough for such a proposition. Yet the case put is but an obvious illustration of the doctrine, presented in the nakedness of its odious deformity. And I desire to tender to the gentleman from Ohio, (Mr. HAMER,) my grateful estimation of the patriotic nationality of sentiment, which he has manifested, in occasional reference heretofore to this topic of debate.

We legislate for a vast country, with its long ocean frontier, and its immense interior expansion. In that stupendous valley of the Mississippi and its tributary waters, the far-western city of St. Louis is, it may be, the geographical centre of the territory of the United States. Our country is destined, possibly, to become co-extensive with the Continent. I do not speak of this as what I wish; but as what, in the expansive progress of our institutions, it may be impossible to avert. Nature has impressed geographical differences on this wide-spread surface of the United States. Part of it lies on the Atlantic Ocean; part on the Gulf of Mexico; part on the inland seas of the North; and part on the thousand offsprings of the great Father of Waters. Our country embraces every diversity of climate, of soil, of location, of productions, which the terraqueous globe affords. Our occupations differ, as our lines are cast here or there within it. The manufacturing and commercial industry of the East, the agriculture and mines of the North and Centre, the planting of the South and the West, all contribute to swell the sum of our greatness. We differ in the quality of the labor we respectively employ. So many multitudinous causes go to complicate the interests with which Congress has to deal. Our legislation is to be founded on all these facts, combined, compared, compromised, with reference to the paramount value of the Union.

Times have occurred, in which one or another of the States thought the power of the Confederacy pressed heavily on her interests or her principles. It has happened to Pennsylvania, to Virginia, to Massachusetts, to South Carolina. Times have occurred, in which some of the States have thought they had not their due proportion of the benefits of the Confederacy. I freely admit that in two of the States of the West, especially, there has been comparatively little of the public money expended in improvements or public works of any kind, comparatively little advantage received under the land system of the United States. I mean, Kentucky and Tennessee. It is equally true of one of the States of the East, to wit, Vermont. So far as regards Kentucky and Tennessee, the fact is owing partly to their being intermediate, historically speaking, between the old and new States; partly to their felicitous geographical position, and other natural advantages; and not least to the fact that neither of them is a frontier State. It is not, I am sure, ascribable to any sectionality of feeling or action on the part of the East towards the West. No such feeling ever did exist; no such action ever did occur. We of the Atlantic States may safely challenge a scrutiny of the political and legislative records of the country, upon such a controversy. It will distinctly appear, in the sequel of my remarks, that it is not the West as a section, in any grouping or aggregation of which the States are susceptible, but simply the two States of Kentucky and Tennessee, which have thus failed to partake in the direct local expenditures of the Union. And the error, committed by the gentleman from Kentucky, consists in putting the question *sectionally*; when there is no tincture of sectionalism, as between East and West, in the facts of the case.

New York, it is alleged, has received more of the public moneys than all the States of the South or South-West! When this remark struck my ear, it raised before my mind's eye the image of that great State, its

boundless enterprise, its magnificent canal which unites the waters of the Lakes and those of the Ocean, its numerous lesser canals, its railroads, its liberally endowed system of public education. I began to doubt all the familiar facts of contemporaneous history. Did the United States subscribe any of its millions towards the construction of the Erie Canal? Did the United States contribute lands, enough for the seat of an empire, to the public schools of the State of New York? Some such things, it seemed to me, I had heard of as falling to the lot of other regions of country; but I had read or imagined that New York was the child, as the Spaniard has it, of her own works; that by her own hands and with her own materials she had built up the structure of her unrivalled prosperity; that she had herself set the example, unaided and alone, of the prosecution of public works of interior communication, on that vast scale, which her success came to render so common throughout the United States.

But it is no question of single States. There is an obvious fallacy in so treating it. To do justice to it, we should take into view sections of country, disregarding political lines, and looking only to geographical relations, or to distinct regions inhabited respectively by a population of congenial interests, occupations, and productions.

I throw together, in one group, the States of the North and East, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, ten; the States or Territories of the West, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Michigan, Wisconsin, nine; those of the South, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, nine; and I proceed to show in what sums and proportions the public money has gone to each of these great sections of the Union.

By a calculation, which I have before me, covering the period from 1789 to 1829, inclusive, it appears that there can be traced into the different States and Territories, excluding the District of Columbia, the sum of \$119,455,187. Of this sum, \$43,567,522, more than one-third, went into Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, one-third in number, greatly less than one-third in population, of all the United States. The plain fact needs no comment.

This calculation does not include the diplomatic charges of the Government, nor such portion of the charges belonging to war as evidently have no locality of expenditure. Nor does it include expenditures on account of the public debt; for the repayment of money to the public creditor, wherever he may dwell, is not an act of local partiality. Nor does it include pensions, which are the recompense of personal services and sacrifices, the debts of honor superinduced by war. If pensions were to be treated as local expenditures, it would give occasion to inquire how it happens that so large a proportion of the persons entitled to pensions reside in particular regions of the country; a course of inquiry which a northern man need feel no unwillingness to pursue.

For the rest, the calculation is conclusive as to the whole question, so far as it is a question between North and South; unless, indeed, we adopt the idea of the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. THOMPSON,) who, to arrive

at a different result, reckons Maryland and Virginia among the States of the North. Such a position is evidently untenable. The doctrine would act fatally against itself, by the undue weight of relative population which it would cast upon the section of the North. It is contrary to the plain sense of the thing, also; since Maryland and Virginia belong to the South by the character of their labor and of their productions. They are essential parts of the slave-holding and planting interests. If, indeed, it could be admitted as a just and serious view of the subject, I should heartily welcome the Old Dominion among the States of the North. I am sure Virginia and New England have in the past time breasted shoulder to shoulder shock after shock, and should feel themselves cemented together by the blood of their fathers commingled in many a well-fought and hard-won battle-field, and by their common attachment to the Union. If there is to be a geographical line run through the Constitution, I rejoice that, after all, it is not Mason and Dixon's.

It would be wearisome to run over all the details of public expenditure, in reference to the question under debate. Instead of this, I shall select, for detailed analysis, several classes of expenditure, which are those chiefly discussed, and which abundantly illustrate the whole subject.

I begin with the fortifications of the maritime frontier.

All the money hitherto expended on these fortifications has been distributed as follows: (Sen. Doc. 24th Cong., No. 203.)

Northern States on the Atlantic.	Southern States on the Atlantic.	On the Gulf.
Maine - - - 0	Maryland - 454,103	Louisiana - 1,444,529
New Hampshire - 0	Virginia - 3,127,837	Alabama - 1,026,777
Massachusetts - 157,509	North Carolina - 760,869	Florida - 704,422
Rhode Island - 962,369	South Carolina - 324,426	
Connecticut - 0	Georgia - 286,184	
New York - 1,022,132		
Delaware - 107,136		
\$2,248,946	\$4,953,419	\$3,175,728

Upon this table, it is to be remarked, first, that the entire system, of which these fortifications form a part, was arranged in 1821, by a Commission composed of General Bernard, Captain Jesse D. Elliott of South Carolina, and Colonel Totten. It was arranged under the auspices of a Secretary of War from the same State, John C. Calhoun; and adopted by President Monroe. It is not the fruit, therefore, of northern councils or partialities. Secondly, in that plan, the works to be constructed were divided into three classes. The works for the protection of Burwell's Bay and of Boston Roads were placed among the first in order of execution, chiefly because Norfolk and Boston were designated to be the great naval arsenals of the country; the one for the South, the other for the North. Certain works in South Carolina were placed in the second and third classes. Yet by some under-current of causes, fortifications at Charleston are in an active and efficient state, while those of the Chesapeake are still incomplete, and those of Massachusetts Bay almost

neglected. A single ship of war might sail up and cannonade Boston or New York with perfect impunity. Finally, it should be borne in mind, that the fortifications on the Gulf are essentially defences for the business and population of the West.

What fortifications have been completed? In the whole North, with its exposed coast, its numerous and wealthy cities, to tempt an invading foe, only two, Fort Hamilton, and Fort Lafayette, at New York. In the South, four, Fort Washington, in Maryland; Fort Macon, in North Carolina; Castle Pinckney, in South Carolina; and Fort Morgan in Alabama. In the West, five, Fort Pike, Fort Wood, Fort Jackson, Battery Bienvenu, and Tower Bayou Dupré, all in Louisiana.

We have two armories, one at Springfield, in Massachusetts, for the North, the other at Harper's Ferry, for the South. In the public expenditures at each, there has been a very near approach to equality, it having been, at the former, from 1816 to 1834 inclusive, \$3,411,765; at the latter, \$3,230,884. (Ex. Doc., 24th Cong., No. 44, p. 365.) An armory is, doubtless, required at the West. The establishment of it has been under consideration for eighteen years. Why has it not been constructed? A western man, at the head of the Committee of Military Affairs, (Mr. R. M. JOHNSON,) himself tells us, it is because of the inability of Congress 'to reconcile contending interests as to its location.' (House Repts., 24th Cong., No. 373.) 'Contending interests' in what quarter? Of the East against the West? No! in the heart of the West itself: an edifying example of the mischievous effects of this narrow localism of spirit. I trust that, so far as regards this armory, the evil will not outlive the present Congress.

There is a like regard to the wants of the various parts of the country in the distribution of arsenals and of depots for arms, as appears by the following table: (Ex. Doc., 24th Cong., No. 44, p. 347.)

North.	South.	West.
Augusta, Me. Watertown, Mass. Vergennes, Vt. Watervliet, N. Y. Rome, N. Y. New York, N. Y. Frankford, Pa.	Washington, D. C. Pikesville, Md. Richmond, Va. Fort Monroe, Va. Augusta, Geo. Mt. Vernon, Ala. Appalachicola, Flo. Charleston, S. C. Fayetteville, N. C.	Detroit, Mich. Pittsburg, Pa. Newport, Ken. St. Louis, Mo. Bellefontaine, Mo. Baton Rouge, La. Two new ones, not located.

That is, *seven* in the section of the North and East, including Lakes Champlain and Ontario, and *seventeen* in the two sections of the South and the waters of the West.

Leaving the article of military works, I proceed to another local expenditure, that of light-houses.

There has been expended on light-houses, in the period from the organization of the Government to the end of the year 1833, the following sums: (Ex. Doc. 2d sess. 23d Cong., No. 89.)

Maine and Massachusetts*	- \$961,292	District of Columbia	- \$3,000
New Hampshire	- 82,376	Maryland	- 155,847
Rhode Island	- 133,422	Virginia	- 361,338
Connecticut	- 175,266	North Carolina	- 381,450
Vermont	- 6,662	South Carolina	- 182,827
New York	- 514,955	Georgia	- 275,513
New Jersey	- 4,925	Florida	- 229,791
Pennsylvania	- 33,400	Alabama	- 27,822
Delaware	- 324,861	Louisiana	- 199,736
		Mississippi	- 18,852
	<u>\$2,237,159</u>		<u>\$1,836,182</u>

Be it remembered, in anticipation of any remark as to the excess of expenditures upon the northern division of the Union, that it is perpetually thronged, at all seasons of the year, with coasting and fishing vessels plying along shore; that the registered seamen of the one and the other division are in the proportion of 5,442 to 1,010; (Ex. Doc., 24th Cong., No. 163;) and that of the entire tonnage of the country, about thirteen-fifteenths belong to the ten first-named States. (Ex. Doc. 2d sess. 23d Cong., No. 187, p. 298.)

Now to the vexed question of internal improvements. This expression is a very vague one, as we all know. In the action of Congress, it is applied to the improvement of the means of moving from place to place, whether in bays and ports of the sea, or rivers, or across the land by canals and roads. To what extent the constitutional power of Congress in this matter reaches, and especially what interior communications are to be deemed national and what not, is among the unsettled points in the construction of the Constitution. The following table will show the amount expended within the several States on this class of public works, from 1789 to 1833 inclusive: (Ex. Doc. 2d ses. 23d Cong., No. 89.)

States of the North. Population 5,619,129.	States of the South. Population 3,838,697.	States of the West. Population 3,205,597.
Maine, - 155,354	Maryland, - 0	Ohio, - 859,124
Massachusetts, - 355,739	Virginia, - 80	Kentucky, - 0
New Hampshire, - 35,529	North Carolina, - 197,573	Indiana, - 270,465
Rhode Island, - 230	South Carolina, - 0	Illinois, - 81,376
Connecticut, - 47,498	Georgia, - 17,914	Michigan, - 206,104
Vermont, - 0	Florida, - 188,372	Missouri, - 44,467
New York, - 446,271	Alabama, - 169,978	Tennessee, - 27,200
New Jersey, - 100		Mississippi, - 65,771
Pennsylvania, - 54,841		Arkansas, - 120,798
Delaware, - 604,371		Louisiana, - 46,553
		Nav. Ohio and Miss. 394,513
<u>\$1,699,933</u>		<u>\$2,116,371</u>
	Dis. Swamp Can., 200,000	
	Chesapeake and	
	Ohio Canal, 999,000	
		Cumberland Road, 3,723,530

* I place Maine and Massachusetts together, because the expenditures cover the period when they were one State.

Several additions to and comments upon these tables are necessary to the full understanding of the facts.

Though Delaware lies almost wholly south of Mason and Dixon's line, I place it in the first column, because the money expended upon it has been quite as much for the benefit of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, as Delaware. I place Louisiana in the third column, because much of the expenditures of the West have been for the improvement of rivers, and in regard to this point, the interest of Louisiana cannot be separated from that of the great valley of the Mississippi.

It would seem, at first impression, that the proportion of public money expended in this way south of Mason and Dixon's line, as compared with the money expended at the North, was in the proportion of one to three, or, measuring it by the ratio to the gross population on each side of the line, one to two; that nothing had been expended in Maryland, next to nothing in Virginia. If it were so, it would be pertinent to refer to the constitutional opinions of the South in elucidation of the circumstance. But it is not the fact. To the sum of 573,917 dollars directly expended, we have to add, of subscriptions prior to 1834, the sum of 200,000 dollars to the Dismal Swamp Canal in Virginia, which stock is at a discount; 999,000 dollars to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal in Maryland, at a loss of more than half a million, without reckoning later sums appropriated to the same object; and 450,000 to the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, partly in Delaware, and partly in Maryland, which has no market value. If these things be taken into consideration, and especially if the calculation on both sides be brought down to the present time, the difference in favor of the North vanishes.

But the most interesting points of comparison as to this, are between the States of the East and the West. Manifestly, the sum expended in the ten States of the North and East, is much less than the sum expended in the eight States and two Territories of the West. I have omitted to reckon the subscription of 233,500 dollars to the Louisville and Portland Canal, because of the value of the stock; but, if the contemplated appropriation to render that canal public should pass both Houses, it will add a million of dollars to the sum total of the column of the West. And shall we say nothing of the Cumberland Road?

Down to the close of 1833, the cost of the Cumberland Road was 3,723,530 dollars. To the same period, the total cost of *internal improvements, fortifications, and light-houses, all together*, in all New England, was but 3,506,751 dollars. Am I told that the Cumberland Road unites the Atlantic and the West? So do the admirable public works constructed at her own expense by the State of Pennsylvania. So do the series of canals and railways, constructed or undertaken at the sole expense of the States of New York and Massachusetts, from the Lakes to Albany, and thence diverging to the cities of New York and of Boston. That it adds to the value of the public lands? So do these. That it is beneficial to the whole country? So are these. That it is a national work. Be it so, if you will. And are not the fortifications and other public works on the maritime frontier, by tenfold greater force of reasoning, national in every element that goes to constitute nationality?

To enter into every one of the details of this extensive subject would be irksome to myself and to the House. I abstain from doing it. The

more you investigate the question, the more conclusively will you make it appear, that all these complaints are fallacious in principle and unfounded in fact. It is the inside of a house, the seat of ease and comfort, finding fault that money is expended on the exposed outside, for the common benefit of the whole edifice and all its inmates. It is impossible, without some pretty radical change in the nature of things, to have a country which is all interior and no part frontier. That frontier has the advantage, if advantage it be, of the money employed in frontier expenses. And it bears the first brunt of battle. Would it not be immeasurably ridiculous for me to complain that the inhabitants of Massachusetts, peaceably pursuing their accustomed avocations, do not enjoy the privilege of seeing some millions of public money spent among them, in the very pleasant way it now circulates in Florida? In a word, the expenditures of the frontier of the United States, whether applied on the Ocean, the Gulf, or the interior, are nevertheless expenditures for and of the heart of the country, which they cover and protect.

Men of high public estimation have soberly affirmed in Congress, that so many millions, drawn from the West, are expended on other parts of the Union. Self-delusion can hardly go beyond this point.—I have shown how and where the public money is disbursed. A word as to how and where it is obtained.

Our revenue from customs is a voluntary tax paid by the consumer of dutiable merchandise. In proportion to the general diffusion of wealth and competency, and to the habits of expense, characteristic of any part of the country, will be its contribution to this branch of the public taxes. It is obvious to perceive, that the section of the North and East consumes far more of commodities subject to duty than either that of the South or that of the West.

Our revenue from the public lands has the *appearance* of coming from the West. It is notorious, however, that far the larger part of the purchase-money is provided by emigrants or capitalists of the Atlantic States. We are every day pouring out our population and our riches into the capacious lap of the West.

There is one other topic, which it would be unjust, in view of both sides of the question, to pass over. I have submitted authentic details in regard to most of the fixed public works. Our marine hospitals on the seaboard are paid for by our seamen out of their own hard earnings, and have nothing to do with the subject. Some appropriations have been made latterly for the construction of custom-houses. The commerce of the country demands it. I can find many an off-set for the cost of them, by looking into the disposition of the public lands. But our navy yards, and the current expenses of the naval service, which are of course on the seaboard, demand consideration. I suppose it must be through these current expenditures of the naval service, that the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. GRAVES) imagines that the section of the North and East is growing rich by the disbursements of the public money.

It is true enough that our navy yards are on the coast, either of the Atlantic or the Gulf. I suppose they would be of very little use on a mountain of the interior, very little in the midst of a prairie. What slight inequality there is in the fact that four of our seven yards are situated at the North, and only three at the South, has been the natural

consequence of circumstances wholly independent of the action of the Government. Where is the mercantile marine built, owned, and manned? Who finds the ships which convey to market the vast productions of the South and West? It is the North, simply because the South has a local advantage in the character of its soil, which as it were extinguishes other branches of industry by its superior productiveness, as the sun does the light of the stars. Cotton-planting is so profitable, that ship-building and other manufactures, or even the production of the necessaries of life, are comparatively neglected by the people of the South. Besides, every thing connected with ship-building is done cheaper at the North. It is not government patronage which enables me to build a merchant-ship at the North, and employ her at the South.

In the country, or section of country, where the mercantile marine flourishes, there will the military marine flourish. You may transfer it to other localities, for great considerations of public good; you may create ports to receive it, where suitable ones were not provided by nature. Still, it is an exotic, sustained by cost and care; not a hardy plant, springing up spontaneously in its native soil.

Now as to the current expenditures for the service of the navy. All articles of merchandise tend towards some great market, within the sphere of which they are produced. Their price has reference to that market. To obtain them on advantageous terms, a purchaser will go, as a matter of course, either to the place of production or to the place of market. This law of trade regulates the actions of private individuals, looking only to their own business. It applies to the purchases made by the United States, with this additional circumstance, that the Government buys on advertised proposals of contract. It does not go to the seller. It makes known its wants, and invites offers. It is immaterial to the Government, where the contractor lives, where he collects the supplies that he furnishes, or where the profits he makes are to be invested or spent. The Government looks only to the quality of the article and the price; except that, as in duty bound, it seeks for things of the growth or manufacture of the United States in preference to imported merchandise. It opens a free competition to every inhabitant of the country, whether he be of the North or the South, the East or the West. If the people of any State,—South Carolina, for instance,—do not put in for contracts, we are to presume it is because they do not produce the article wanted, or have other business that is more profitable.

Ay, but the still-reproached East, the ever-patient East! We, it seems, grow rich by the expenditure among us of the money of the United States. Absurd! We prosper, as we did before this Government existed, and as we should if it were to cease to exist in this hour, by the energies that are within us; by the properties of character, which our sect and our fathers displayed in the overthrow of the monarchy of England, which brought them hither to this New World, and which marshalled them forward into the van of the battles of the Revolution.

I aver that the government expenditures in the States of the East are not sufficient to exert any sensible effect upon their general industry or prosperity. Take an example, to show the truth of the case in the clearest light. Suppose you are to expend half a million of dollars in the construction and equipment of a ship of the line. What por-

tion of the materials of that ship is furnished by the States of the East? Timber? No, that comes from Florida, and elsewhere at the South. Sails and cordage? Cotton is from the South, and hemp from Russia, or from the State of Kentucky. Copper, iron, lead? These are from Pennsylvania, from Wisconsin, or from foreign countries, except now and then a little iron smelted from bog-ore at the North. Flour? We import corn and wheat in vast quantities for our own consumption; we have none to sell to the Navy Department. Molasses, sugar, rice? None of these are produced in Yankee land. Pork and beef? They come to us from the great pastures of the interior, from the banks of the Ohio, from the State of Kentucky itself. To scarce any thing of all the costly materials and equipments of that ship can New England lay claim, unless it be a few white-pine spars and locust treenails, which are among the most insignificant of the items in the charges of her construction. Some things, however, our soil has contributed to the composition of the navy. We have given you the skill and science to shape and combine its inanimate materials, the productions of your forests, your fields, and your mines, and to form these into noble fabrics, which walk on the water at our command as things of life. We have given you the brave sailors, who man your gun-decks, and who, in the darkest hour of doubtful warfare, threw themselves into the strife, summoned back victory to your standard, and caused its star-spangled folds to fling themselves out in triumph once again to the breezes of their own blue heaven.—These are the things which the East contributes to the navy of the Union.

In these remarks, I act wholly on the defensive. I deny the alleged fact of inequality in the distribution of the public expenditures; I deny the alleged causes or motives of the supposed inequality. There are two sides to this question. If I chose to do it, I could easily turn the tables on gentlemen, and from defence proceed to attack. Hundreds of times I have heard it complainingly said at the North,—We pay for our lands, without any favors as to time, or reduction as to price, on the part of Government. No millions have been expended among us in the extinguishment of Indian titles. We have no profitable pre-emption speculations. No money by millions of dollars, no land by millions of acres, has been bestowed on us for aid in the construction of canals, roads, and railways. Our country is filled with common schools and the higher institutions of instruction, with no thanks to the rest of the Union; for not to us, as to the States of the West, has Congress given 9,030,469 acres of public land for the uses of education.

I denounce all such murmurs against the West, when I hear them in the mouths of my constituents at home; and I denounce all such murmurs against the North, when I hear them in the mouths of the members of this House. To the North I say,—The five millions expended on the Cumberland Road, the two millions of acres of public land, and the two or three millions of dollars in money, appropriated to similar objects, have been carried by the votes of your own Representatives in Congress; that vast donation of lands to the new States of the West for the aid of education, like the perpetual prohibition of slavery in a part of the same region, was the large and enlightened idea of your own Nathan Dane; and I honor and applaud the patriotic forecast, and the generous liberality, which looked to the good of the whole nation, instead of shut-

ting up the mind in the narrow limits of a single State. I am sorry that the same lawgiver did not possess a yet wider field for the operation of his ordinance.

To the West in general, I say,—You are mistaken as to the facts, when you suppose there is partiality in the action of the Federal Congress to your prejudice. It is quite the other way, as mathematical demonstration will show.

To Kentucky I say,—The inequalities of which you complain are State inequalities, not sectional ones. Thus, we have spent in New Hampshire for internal improvements 35,529 dollars, in Vermont nothing; in North Carolina 197,573 dollars, in South Carolina nothing; in Kentucky nothing, and 859,124 dollars in Ohio. The simple juxtaposition of these examples of inequality proves that there is nothing sectional in the fact, unless you mean to hand over Ohio and Louisiana to the East, in the same deed, and by the same rule of transfer, which carry Virginia.

To every member of this House, whatever spot of the Union he represents, I say,—Away with these local complaints; I am ashamed of them; they are unworthy of an American Congress.—I have three sufficient answers for all such complaints. In the first place, it is immaterial to me where the money of an appropriation is to be expended. Is the appropriation constitutional? Is it required by the public service? These are the questions to be asked. In the second place, there is no just foundation for the complaints. I concur to the letter in the sentiment of the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. THOMPSON,) that a union of States, such as ours, like the relations of private friendship, to be lasting, must be one of perfect equality. I say this equality exists, to all practical purposes, on a fair and general view of the great sections of the Union. And if a State were to come here and say it could not be loyal without money, I would sooner spend money on it needlessly, lavishly, wastefully, ay, throw money away on it, than see it disaffected for want of expenditures within it, under the impression that it is unfairly treated by Congress or the sister States. Finally, whatever inequalities of this kind there might be, I say they would be counterbalanced a thousand-fold by the general benefits of the Union,—the exemption of the States from domestic wars, border differences, impediments of intercourse,—and their unity of force in foreign affairs. It is frequently said by gentlemen from the West, that the cost of Louisiana and Florida should not be charged to the receipts of the public lands, because of the political advantages of the acquisition to the whole Union. Be it so, but let the same rule be applied to other public expenditures. Remember that great objects cannot be attained, except by the compromise and sacrifice of minor objects. Call to mind the strikingly pertinent observations of a celebrated statesman in reference to this subject: ‘All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter. We balance inconveniences; we give and take; we remit some rights, that we may enjoy others; and we choose rather to be happy citizens than subtle disputants. As we must give some natural liberty to enjoy civil advantages, so we must sacrifice some civil liberties, for the advantages to be derived from the communion and fellowship of a great empire.’ This consideration lies at the very foundation of a Union, which, in its beautiful sys-

tem, realizes the dreams of St. Pierre and Rousseau, of a continent confederated in the cause of civilization and peace.

In conclusion of all the statistical details, with which I have troubled the House, I have these further facts to present. The electoral colleges of New England have supported southern men for the Chief Magistracy of this nation three times unanimously, once with but one negative, again by large majorities,—but from the organization of the Government to this day only nine votes have been thrown by all the States south of the Potomac for presidential candidates north of that river. Add to which, the corresponding fact of one or the other of two candidates for the Presidency, presented by the West, having been warmly supported by nearly the entire mass of the population of New England. I do not speak of this in reproach of the South or the West; but simply in vindication of the justice and fairness of the North.

Our country, with all its sectional diversity of views and feelings, is ONE. It is one in the rich, manly, vigorous, expressive language we speak, which is become the vernacular tongue as it were of parliamentary eloquence, the very dialect of constitutional freedom. It is one in the fame of our fathers, and in the historical reminiscences which belong to us as a nation. It is one in the political principles of republicanism which we feel and profess in common, no matter in what spot of earth our portion be cast. It is one in the substantial basis of our manners, in the warp at least of which the web is woven. It is one in the ties of friendship, affinity, and blood, binding us together, throughout the whole extent of the land, in the associations of trade, of emigration, and of marriage. It is one in the general balance of interests and of business, arising from our mutual wants and the reciprocal interchanges of the products of our industry. It is one in our exterior relations, protected as these are by the honored flag of the Union. It is one in that glorious Constitution, the best inheritance transmitted to us by our fathers, the monument of their wisdom and their virtue, under whose shelter we live and flourish as a People.

One we are in fact, one should we be in sentiment. To this great Republic, union is peace, union is grandeur, union is power, union is honor, union is every thing which a free-spirited and mighty nation should glory to possess. To us all, next to independence, next to liberty, next to honor, be we persuaded that a cordial and abiding confederacy of the American People is the greatest of earthly goods. We, the several States which compose it, entered into it with conciliation to the people of our sister States in our hearts, and compromise of all secondary interests in our acts. Thus let us persevere, with the same emotions, fresh and bright as in the first conception, and welling forth in exhaustless abundance from our bosoms; feeling that, like the fabled fountains of Florida, they are capable to communicate matchless beauty and everlasting youth to this our beloved Republic.

That, unlike other political societies, this will endure unchangeable forever, I cannot hope; but I pray to God, if in the decrees of his providence he have any mercy in store for me, not to suffer me to behold the hour of its dissolution: its glory extinct; the banner of its pride rent and trampled in the dust; its nationality a moral of history; its grandeur, a lustrous vision of the morning slumber, vanished; its liberty, a disem-

bodied spirit, brooding, like the genius of the past, amid the prostrate monuments of its old magnificence.

And there is, in the burning chambers of the dread hereafter, no infinite of wrath vast enough, for him, who, Eratostratus-like, to be remembered only for infamy, shall apply the torch of destruction to this fair Ephesian temple of our Union. That time, in some long, long future age, and that person, may come, for the overthrow of our country. Accursed be the traitor, whensoever and wheresoever shall be his advent among us, like the spirit of evil, issuing from his realms of darkness to trouble the pure bliss of Paradise.—To him that shall compass or plot the dissolution of this Union, I would apply language resembling what I remember to have seen of an old anathema: Wherever fire burns, or water runs; wherever ship floats or land is tilled; wherever the skies vault themselves, or the lark carols to the dawn, or sun shines, or earth greens in his ray; wherever God is worshipped in temples or heard in thunder; wherever man is honored or woman loved;—there, from thenceforth and forever, shall there be to him no part or lot in the honor of man or the love of woman.—Ixion's revolving wheel, the overmantling cup at which Tantalus may not slake his unquenchable thirst, the insatiable vulture gnawing at the immortal heart of Prometheus, the rebel giants writhing in the volcanic fires of Ætna, are but faint types of his doom.

I speak plainly and strongly, as I feel, and without mincing my words; because I believe it to be the duty of every man, and especially of us, who are among the appointed sentinels of the Constitution, to look well to these the issues of life and death to this nation. I do not, I cannot, I will not, believe that opinions, adverse hereto, exist any where within the bounds of the Republic; and I would forestall their possible future up-springing. I would have our allegiance to the Union unshaken and unshakeable; our constancy in the public cause, fixed as the north star in the firmament; our dedication to its interests, a vestal-fire burning on with unextinguishable flame forever. Here, in the eyes of our countrymen, and of the world, with the muse of history before us to record our deeds and our words, let us, like Hannibal at the altar of his gods, swear eternal faithfulness to our country, eternal hatred to its foes. Show we that we are wedded to the Union for weal and for wo, as the fondest lover would hug to his heart the bride bound to him in the first bright ardor of young possession. We have not purposed to embark in this venture only to sail over the smooth surface of a summer sea, with hope and pleasure to waft us joyously along; but with resolved spirits, ready to meet, like true men, whatever of danger and vicissitude may descend upon our voyage, and to stand up gallantly for the treasure of honor and faith intrusted to our charge. Rally we, then, to the stripes and stars, as the symbol of glory to us, and the harbinger of liberty to all the nations of the world. So long as a shred of that sacred standard remains to us, let us cling to it, with such undying devotion, as the Christian pilgrims of the middle age cherished the least fragment of the cross; and let us fly to its rescue, when periled, whether by foreign or domestic assault, as they did to snatch the holy sepulchre from the desecration of the Infidel.

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